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INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades there have been some remarkable differences between the U.S. and many 
European countries in  the way that lawsuits are funded.  For example, in the U.S., neither the 
federal government nor any state has enacted a statutory right to counsel in civil cases.
1
  Nearly 
all European nations have enacted statutory rights to counsel in criminal and civil cases.
2
  In the 
U.S., contingency fees are allowed, and they offer a solution in many cases, especially for 
plaintiffs with limited financial means.
3
  On the other hand, most European countries do not 
allow contingency fees.
4
 Some recent trends in litigation financing in the U.S. and in Europe may 
increase the differences in these two approaches to litigation funding.  In the U.S., legal expenses 
insurance (LEI) for bringing claims is virtually absent,
5
 but third-party litigation funding (TPF) is 
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a growing phenomenon.
6
  Third-party financing of litigation is the ―phenomenon of . . . provision 
of capital . . . by nontraditional sources to civil plaintiffs, defendants, or their lawyers to support 
litigation-related activities.‖ 7   Therefore, this term refers to financing by those other than 
plaintiffs, defendants, insurers, and lawyers.
8
  Although TPF is not widespread, it is playing an 
increasingly visible role.  Its recent growth may be explained by a host of factors, including: 
increasing litigation costs, professional responsibility rules that forbid lawyers to pay the living 
expenses of their clients while litigation is pending, and the lack of capital in the traditional 
lending market to fund litigation. 
Although many European countries still provide generous legal aid, others have pushed 
or are seriously considering pushing consumers into entering private insurance arrangements to 
guarantee access to the courts.  For example, before December 1, 1997, most Swedes could rely 
on public legal aid when they needed legal advice or a lawyer to go to court.
9
  Since that day, 
however, most Swedes have had to rely on their mandatory legal expenses insurance policy to 
have access to legal services.
10
  A 2007 report prepared on behalf of the UK‘s Ministry of Justice 
concludes that legal insurance is an underexplored means of promoting access to justice.
11
  The 
report also offers different suggestions to promote LEI to a broader public.
12 13
  Briefly 
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 3 
summarized, the trend in Europe reflects an ex ante approach to funding of litigation, whereas 
the trend in the U.S. reflects an ex post approach. 
This article compares TPF and LEI from an economic perspective.  Such a comparison 
deserves attention for at least two reasons.  First, as this article will argue, LEI is not particularly 
widespread in Europe, as is often alleged.  In most European countries in which the government 
does not push LEI (e.g., by making it compulsory), LEI is not that common.
14
  The possibility of 
entering into contingency-fee contracts cannot explain this phenomenon because such contracts 
are forbidden in most European countries.
15
  Also, even though one would expect a large fraction 
of households in European countries with limited legal aid budgets to be covered by LEI, this is 
not always the case.  For example, in Belgium, where contingency fees are prohibited, only 20% 
of the population is covered by public legal aid.
16
  The number of Belgians having LEI, however, 
is quite low.
17
  This raises the question whether the market for LEI suffers from market failure, 
and if a failure in the market for LEI could hinder the development of the market for TPF.  We 
will discuss the following potential reasons for the limited supply of LEI and TPF: the existence 
of alternatives for access to justice, adverse selection, moral hazard, and the free rider problem. 
An economic comparison of TPF and LEI may also shed light on the relative social costs 
of TPF and LEI.  The social efficiency of TPF has been intensely debated in the recent 
literature,
18
 and many advantages and disadvantages have been examined.
19
  This article will 
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examine to what extent TPF and LEI differ with respect to these advantages and disadvantages.  
It will look at the volume of litigation, the quality of litigation, the accuracy and likelihood of 
settlement, and the transaction costs of disputes.  Such a comparison could help policymakers 
decide whether or not to stimulate TPF (e.g., through relaxing some current legal restrictions) 
and/or legal expenses insurance (e.g., by a tax deduction). 
 Section I provides data, facts, and the legal background for both LEI and TPF.  It 
examines differences between LEI in the U.S. and in Europe in greater detail, showing great 
differences between the U.S. and Europe as well as between individual European countries.  LEI 
for bringing a claim is not only quite rare in the U.S.,—at least in its pure form, but also in many 
European countries.  Furthermore, in those European countries where a large fraction of 
households have LEI, this is due to the intervention of policymakers.  Section II examines 
several potential reasons why LEI markets and policies may be underdeveloped.  It discusses 
why most of those reasons cannot fully explain the low prevalence of LEI and analyzes whether 
these factors could hinder the development of TPF.  Finally, section III examines the advantages 
and disadvantages of the ex ante approach—LEI—and the ex post approach—TPF. 
 
I. LEI AND TPF IN THE US AND IN EUROPE: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, FACTS AND 
DATA 
 
A. LEI 
 
1. General remarks 
 
Generally, LEI is ―a voluntary private insurance that covers the costs of lawsuits.‖20  It is 
also known as legal cost insurance, legal protection insurance, or simply legal insurance.
21
  In 
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France, LEI is called L’assurance de protection juridique. 22   In Germany it goes by 
Rechtsschutzversicherung.
23
  Directive 87/344/EEC of June 22, 1987 of the European Union on 
the coordination of laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to LEI defines the 
termas follows:  
 
Such consists in undertaking, against the payment of a premium, to bear the costs 
of legal proceedings and to provide other services directly linked to insurance 
cover, in particular with a view to (a) securing  compensation for the loss, 
damage or injury suffered by the insured person, by settlement out of court or 
through civil or criminal proceedings, (b) defending or representing the insured 
person in civil, criminal, administrative or other proceeding or in respect of any 
claim made against him.
24
 
 
This article focuses on LEI for bringing claims, as LEI for defending against claims is almost 
always part of liability insurance contracts.
25
  Furthermore, it focuses on before-the-event (BTE) 
insurance, not after-the-event (ATE) insurance.  BTE insurance is taken out by individuals 
wishing to protect themselves against potential litigation costs that could be incurred following a 
future event.
26
  ATE insurance covers future legal expenses in a case where a dispute has already 
occurred, such as an accident that has caused an injury.
27
  It is also important to distinguish 
between add-on LEI and stand-alone LEI.  The former is added on to existing policies that 
already have a high market penetration, such as household insurance and motor vehicle 
insurance.
28
  Stand-alone policies, however, are concluded separately from any other insurance 
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agreement.
29
  Most current LEI policies are of the add-on type.
30
  Finally, a distinction can be 
made between pure forms of LEI and legal services plans.
31
  The pure form of LEI originated in 
Europe and still predominates there.
32
  It applies principles present in other forms of insurance.
33
  
The pure form of LEI is a means of financing the often unpredictable costs of civil lawsuits, as it 
spreads the risk of these costs among all policyholders.  Legal services plans, on the other hand, 
do not use insurance principles, but rather create benefits for policyholders by relying on bulk 
savings.
34
  These plans are found mainly in the U.S. and Canada.
35
 
 
2. United States 
 
When discussing LEI in the U.S., it is necessary to distinguish between group legal 
services plans and prepaid legal services plans, both of which play a sizable role in the American 
legal system.  In 1999, approximately 110 million Americans were estimated to be covered by 
some type of legal coverage (personal, business, union, military, or employee) plan.
36
  In 2002, 
122 million Americans were covered by a group legal service plan (68 million) or prepaid legal 
services plan (54 million).
37
 
Group legal services plans usually offer free consultations and discounts on legal services 
to members of groups that sponsor the plans (e.g., unions and membership organizations such as 
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the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)).
38
  The members generally only pay the 
membership fee to join the group and then access the legal services for free.
39
  Discounts are 
based on the participating lawyers‘ usual fees.40  In 2002, the top four group legal services plans 
covered more than 90% of individuals enrolled in such plans: the Union Plus Legal Services Plan 
(45%), the AARP plan (20%), the elder hotlines (20%) and the plan sponsored by the National 
Education Association (6%).
41
 
Prepaid legal services plans, on the other hand, are generally sold by companies that 
contract with lawyers in private practices to provide the services.  The larger union plans mainly 
offer legal counseling through their own employees.  These employees may be attorneys, but 
often they are not and have little or no formal legal education.
42
  Most prepaid plans are offered 
to employees by their employers as part of a benefit package, sold either directly to employees 
by their employers at special rates, or sold directly to the public.
43
  In general, the prepaid plans 
are limited in scope and only provide low-cost assistance for routine legal matters.
44
  For 
example, members of AARP receive up to forty-five minutes of free consultation, low cost 
simple wills and powers of attorneys, and a 20% discount on all other services provided by 
participating attorneys.
45
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3. Europe 
 
The main obligations on insurance companies that offer LEI in European countries can be 
found in Directive 87/344/EEC of June 22, 1987 of the European Union, which discusses the 
coordination of laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to LEI.
46
  National 
regulations, apart from the ones implementing this directive, generally do not contain many 
specific provisions dealing with LEI.
47
  First, the EU directive requires insurance companies to 
provide a separate contract or a separate section of a single policy for LEI.  Second, to mitigate 
the risk of conflicts of interest, insurance companies must either (a) have separate management 
for LEI, (b) entrust the management of claims with respect to LEI to a company with a separate 
legal identity; or (c) must afford the insured the right to entrust the defense of his interests to a 
lawyer of his choice, from the moment that he has the right to claim from his insurer under the 
policy.  In all cases where recourse to a lawyer is available, the insured must have the right to 
choose his lawyer.  Finally, in the event of a conflict of interest or a disagreement over 
settlement of the dispute, the insurer must inform the insured of his right to choose his lawyer 
freely and of the possibility of using an arbitration procedure.  With respect to mass claim 
actions, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) recently had to decide whether clauses that entitle 
insurers to limit their performance to the bringing of test cases, or where appropriate, to 
collective redress or other ways of asserting legal interests by legal representatives selected by 
them, are a permissible limitation of the insured‘s rights where the interests of several insured 
persons are directed against the same opponents.
48
  The ECJ ruled that they are not. 
                                               
     
46
 1987 O.J. (L 185) 77-80. 
     
47
 McDonald et al., supra note 12, at 48. 
     
48
 Case C-199/08, Eschig v. UNIQA Sachversicherung AG, 2009 E.C.R. I-08295. 
 9 
 Turning from the legal framework to facts and data, we start with the UK, where  BTE 
insurance has been available for more than thirty-five years.
49
  BTE is sold in a variety of ways.  
First and foremost, insurance companies sell it as an add-on to motor or household insurance 
(i.e., as an optional policy).  Only some insurers incorporate it into the household insurance 
policy.  In 2005, 75% of all households had home contents insurance.
50
  Many people do not take 
the BTE option, however.  BTE is also sold directly through banks and building societies, or 
attached to travel insurance.  For employment matters, people sometimes have access to BTE 
through membership in a trade union or other affinity group.  BTE is often sold through 
intermediaries: national brokers, broker chains, and smaller regional brokers. 
The UK market is dominated by add-on policies. The penetration rate of comprehensive 
stand-alone policies remains low—about 2% of households51—with the exception of commercial 
policies.  With respect to add-ons, more UK households take BTE as an add-on to motor 
insurance rather than to household insurance.  In 2006, about 18.5 million UK consumers held 
BTE as part of their car insurance, another 14.2 million bought BTE as an add-on to their 
household insurance, and 4.7 million more purchased BTE with their travel insurance.
52
  The UK 
population is about 62 million.  BTE as an add-on to household insurance offers more extensive 
coverage than the standard add-on to a motor policy.
53
  A BTE policy added to household 
insurance generally covers personal injury, property protection, tax protection, employment 
disputes, contract disputes, and certain aspects of legal defense.  Via add-ons to motor insurance 
policies, claim handlers enable individuals to recover from third parties any uninsured losses or 
compensation for personal injury following a motor accident.  The types of claims that typically 
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 Id. at 39. 
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 Id. at 12. 
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 Id. 
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occur under a personal BTE policy are: personal injury (50%), consumer disputes (16%), 
employment disputes (20%), property disputes (8%), and medical negligence (6%).
54
 The policy 
limits are not always very high. 
 France was the first European country where LEIproducts were offered.
55
  In 2008, there 
were 5.4 million stand-alone LEI contracts (with an average premium of €62) and 15 million LEI 
policies added to general household insurance (with an average premium of €20 for the 
add-on).
56
  The low average premiums, together with the fact that LEI only provided for 2.5% of 
French lawyers‘ incomes and plaintiffs have some form of LEI in only 2% of French court cases, 
demonstrate that LEI‘seconomic importance in France is very modest.57 
 The German market for LEI is dominated by stand-alone policies.  Most stand-alone 
policies do not cover all domains of law, allowing  policyholders to choose a la carte from 
several areas of coverage according to their needs   (e.g., property law, contract law, 
employmentlaw).
58
  The policies do not cover abstract legal advice—an insured event must occur 
first.
59
  Given the extensive monopoly rights held by German lawyers, in-house lawyers do not 
deal with cases.  Routine transactions, such as legal advice and assistance with documents, are 
                                               
     
54
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 Kilian, supra note 5, at 32.  In France, LEI is regulated by the Loi portant réforme de l'assurance de protection 
juridique.  Loi 2007-210 du 19 février 2007 portant réforme de l'assurance de protection juridique [Law 2007-210 of 
Feb. 19, 2007 on Reform of Legal Expenses Insurance], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 21, 2007, p. 3051. 
     
56
 Bernard Cerveau, Aide Juridictionnelle et Assurance de Protection Juridique, at 5, http://www.avocats-
lille.com/doc/aj/AJ_assurance_protection_juridique.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).  In 2005, 21 percent of 
households had legal expenses insurance.  Marie-Hélène Beaulieu & Jacinthe Lauzon,  L’assurance juridique: une 
solution pour une meilleure accessibilité à la justice? (Mar. 2007), at 21, http://www.option-
consommateurs.org/documents/principal/fr/File/rapports/assurances/oc_assurance_juridique_200704.pdf. 
     
57
 360,000 cases were opened, 60,000 ended up in court.  See Cerveau, supra note 61, at 5. 
     
58
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59
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DEUTSCHES RECHT 745, 748 (1998). 
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rarely covered by such stand-alone policies.  In 2000, 42% of households were covered by 
stand-alone LEI policies,
60
 a figure that rose to 44% in 2004.
61
 
 In the early 1970s, Sweden introduced one of the most comprehensive and generous legal 
aid schemes in the world.  The legal aid scheme, which included advice and assistance related to 
litigation, was made available to most Swedes and covered most legal problems.
62
 In 1997, the 
Swedish government radically reformed its legal services policy and drastically reducedpublic 
expenditures on legal aid.  The relationship between public legal aid and private forms of 
financing legal assistance was reversed.  Since December 1, 1997, most Swedes have had to use 
their LEI policy to access legal services.
63
  However, this has not proven to be a great burden, as 
97% of Swedes are covered by LEI.
64
  The pervasiveness of LEI in Sweden is attributable to the 
fact that coverage for legal expenses is automatically included in household insurance policies. 
 Data from the Commitée Européen des Assurances (CEA) demonstrate that LEI 
represented only 1% of total European insurance premiums in 2008.
65
  The CEA data also 
demonstrates the growth of LEI premium expenditures between 2000 and 2008 for several 
European countries.  On the basis of this data, it is apparent that although LEI is becoming more 
widespread in Europe, its impact in absolute terms remains modest. 
 
Country   Premium expenditure per   Premium expenditure per 
                                               
     
60
 The figure is for the year 2000.  See Kilian, supra note 5, at 38. 
     
61
 See Matthias Kilian & Francis Regan, Legal Expenses Insurance and Legal Aid – Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
The Experience from Germany and Sweden, 11 INT‘L J. LEGAL PROF. 233, 238 (2004). 
     
62
 Regan, supra note 10, at 52.  
     
63
 Id. at 50. 
     
64
 See C.M.C. van Zeeland & J.M. Barendrecht, Legal Aid Systems Compared, (2003), 
http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/law/research/tisco/publications/reports/legal-aid-systems.pdf available at 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=11571. 
     
65
 See CEA INUSRERS OF EUROPE, CEA STATISTICS N°37: EUROPEAN INSURANCE IN FIGURES 9 (2009) available 
at http://www.cea.eu/uploads/Modules/Publications/eif-
2009.pdfhttp://www.cea.eu/uploads/Modules/Publications%5Ceif-2009.pdf. 
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                                               capita 2008 (Euro)
66
   capita 2000 (Euro) 
 
Austria   47.98     33.78 
Belgium   31.73     21.89 
Germany   38.97 32.71 
Spain    3.97 1.86 
Finland   10.37 5.84 
France    11.47     6.06 
Italy    4.79     2.11 
Netherlands   41.33 15.87 
Poland    9.83 2.19 
United Kingdom  11.76 2.90 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
At first sight, the differences between LEI in the U.S. and in Europe could not be greater.  
American group and prepaid legal services plans are not truly insurance policies and only cover a 
limited amount of services, whereas the European LEI policies seem much broader.  However, 
on closer inspection, the differences should not be exaggerated for two reasons.  First, there are 
many European countries where LEI is virtually absent.  Second, some of the European data 
need to be put in perspective. 
With the Swedish and the German data in mind, one could argue that insurance markets 
for legal services do not face any inherent obstacles to development.  However, as has been 
explained before, Swedish LEI policies are automatically added on to household insurance 
policies which already have a large market penetration.  Swedes do not have the option to 
purchase household insurance without LEI.
67
  LEI is integrated in these policies ―for free.‖  
                                               
     
66
 Note that premium income per capita cannot be easily translated into the percentage of households that have 
LEI in a given country.  The premium income per capita may be misleading, as LEI policies can vary from very 
broad (covering all kinds of legal cases) to very narrow (e.g. covering only motor accident cases). 
     
67
 The Swedish model is hence what is referred to as compulsory add-on insurance: LEI is automatically added 
on to voluntary purchased insurance policies with a high market penetration.  LEI in Sweden is supposedly added 
―for free,‖ but because it is automatically added on to the household insurance, the reality is that the price for LEI is 
included in the premium for the basic insurance.  It is hence obviously not ―free,‖ but rather not directly visible.  See 
Regan, supra note 29, at 294. 
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Additionally, many cases are excluded (including divorce).
68
    This can be explained 
historically.  The Swedish labor movement promoted LEI in the 1960s because legal aid, focused 
on low-income people, failed to reach middle-income earners.
69
  LEI was designed to cover 
problems, costs, and groups that were excluded from legal aid.  These policies were rather 
modest, as the legal aid regime at the time was quite comprehensive.     Finally, claims on LEI 
require policyholders to pay an upfront fee along with a fraction of the estimated costs of the 
case.
70
 
 In Germany, other non-compulsory insurances are much more popular than LEI.  For 
example,  ―65 percent of all households have a [sic] general liability insurance and 75 percent 
have a [sic] household insurance.‖71  Research by Kilian (2003) shows that we should expect the 
demand for LEI to be high in Germany.  The regulatory environment in Germany is very 
favorable for the development of the LEI market because:
72
 (1) the German government only 
spends a modest amount on legal aid; (2) almost all forms of output-based remuneration are 
prohibited including not only contingent fees, but also conditional fees
73
 and success fees; (3) 
even a party enjoying legal aid who loses her claim has to pay her opponents‘ costs and only her 
own lawyer‘s and court fees are covered by legal aid; (4) lawyers enjoy monopoly rights for out 
of court work (not just for representation in court but also for e.g. legal advice), making it 
virtually impossible to obtain lower-priced legal advice from non-lawyers (e.g. paralegals); (5) 
the existence of a very formal and transparent fee regulation, laid down in the 
Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebührenordnung (BRAGO, German Federal Code of Lawyers‘ Fees), that 
                                               
     
68
 Kilian and Regan, supra 69, at 15-16. 
     
69
 Id. at 14. 
     
70
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gives insurance companies a good idea of the ultimate risk and simplifies the calculation of 
premiums; and (6) the German Bar has very little reason to oppose a shift from public legal aid 
to private insurance.
74
  Indeed, in countries where the interest of the Bar is sufficiently protected 
by the regulatory environment, the Bar has generally not opposed government efforts to shift the 
emphasis from public aid to private insurance. 
Whether the German Bar opposes the development of LEI depends primarily on three 
factors.  The first, factor is whether lawyers enjoy monopoly rights, not only for representation in 
court, but also for out of court work.  If lawyers only enjoy monopoly rights for in-court 
representation, they have more to lose when LEI becomes more popular.  This means that 
insurance companies then can handle a large fraction of the cases (the relatively simple ones) 
themselves, without having to hire a lawyer.
75
  The second, factor is whether the insured can 
freely choose the lawyer that will handle their case.  When insurance companies need to hire a 
lawyer (whether mandated to do so or in complex cases where a settlement cannot be reached), 
the insurance company has a natural incentive to keep costs under control, unlike a lawyer that is 
paid on an hourly basis.  If the insured can choose his lawyer freely, this eliminates—or at least 
reduces—the possibility for insurance companies to create competition between different 
lawyers and law firms.
76
  The third factor is whether the government has established and 
enforces minimum fees for lawyers.  Even when insurance companies can force a lawyer upon 
the insured, competition between lawyers will never lead to lower than minimum fees when the 
government enforces minimum fee rules.     Minimum fees and monopoly rights for out of court 
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work protect German lawyers from the competitive effects that otherwise would result from the 
insured being able to choose a lawyer.
77
 
 
B. TPF in the United States
78
 
 
The current TPF industry in the U.S. can be divided into three relatively active segments: 
(1) consumer legal funding (non-recourse loans) to individuals, usually personal injury plaintiffs; 
(2) loans and lines of credit for plaintiffs‘ law firms; and (3) investments in commercial 
lawsuits.
79
  All of these segments of the TPF industryprovide financial support for plaintiff-side 
efforts.
80
  Presently, there is very little TPF for American defendants,
81
 although some providers 
of plaintiff-side TPF are also interested in providing funding to defendants and their lawyers.
82
  
For now, TPF does not seem like it will play an important role in the U.S. class action market,
83
 
as a number of investment firms have claimed that they do not intend to enter that market.
84
  In 
the context of consumer legal funding, a consumer‘s potential recovery from a class action may 
seldom be large enough to obtain a non-recourse loan.    
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 Dozens of TPF companies provided funding to consumers with pending legal claims
85
 in 
2010.
86
  As the great majority of these lawsuits involve personal injury claims (mainly auto 
accidents) and only consumers who have found a lawyer who has agreed to represent the client 
are eligible for funding, almost all of these consumers are being represented on a 
contingency-fee basis.
87
  Typically, the TPF company provides funds to the consumer in 
exchange for a promise to pay back the funds plus a contracted fee.
88
  Although the fee does not 
depend on the amount of the recovery, it typically increases with the time elapsed.
89
  The 
contracts are typically non-recourse loans, meaning that the consumer is never obligated to pay 
more than the proceeds from the underlying lawsuit.  The financing fees can significantly exceed 
interest rates on consumer bank loans or on credit card balances.
90
  Typical rates would be 3 to 
5% monthly interest,
91
 although some companies charge less than 2%.  The average size of the 
cash advance tends to be less than 10% of estimated values of the underlying claim.
92
  
Consumers may be interested in these loans because their ability to obtain funding from other 
sources is exhausted or they like that they never have to pay back more than the proceeds of the 
lawsuit. 
 Unlike for consumer legal funding, loans to plaintiffs‘ law firms are not non-recourse.93  
A law firm‘s debts are typically secured by all of the firm‘s assets, including its real property and 
future fees from its cases.  Little is known about the interest rates charged to firms, but interest 
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rates of about 20% appear to be common.
94
  Law firms‘ motives to use this type of funding are 
the desire to remain solvent, alleviate cash-flow problems, compete for business with firms that 
have more capital, and invest more in pending cases.
95
 
 Garber (2010) identified six companies that provide capital directly to 
businesses-plaintiffs or their outside counsel to finance costs of pending commercial claims 
(business-against-business).
96
  The disputes are usually antitrust, intellectual property, or 
contracts cases.  The TPF companies provide capital in return for a share of the corporate 
plaintiff‘s recovery, hence the term investment for these transactions.  Several motives have been 
advanced to explain why companies consider this type of funding.  Some companies may want to 
use less of their own capital to pay outside counsel.
97
  Others may want an assessment of the 
merits and economic value of their claim in addition to the one provided by their outside 
counsel.
98
  Next, some companies might use TPF strategically in the hope of strengthening their 
bargaining position.  The provision of TPF could signal that the claim is of high merit to the 
defendant.
99
  And last, corporate general counsel may be loath to ask for a budget increase.
100
 
 The legal status of TPF in the United States is unclear.
101
  Laws governing TPF 
agreements vary widely among states.  Only a few states have adopted regulations specifically 
for TPF.
102
  These statutes generally focus on loans in personal injury cases, not on commercial 
litigation.  To date, no U.S. court has considered the legality of TPF in the context of commercial 
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litigation.
103
  With respect to loan agreements in personal injury suits, the case law is mixed.  
Many courts have held these agreements to be valid and enforceable.
104
  Other courts, however, 
have invalidated these agreements.
105
  The most frequently cited criticism is that loan agreements 
in personal injury suits violate the common law doctrines of maintenance and champerty.  
Maintenance is the interference in litigation by those without a legitimate interest in the claim.  
Champerty is maintenance by those who seek to profit from another‘s lawsuit.106  Although there 
have been few prosecutions in the last century, the doctrines are still considered valid in the U.S.  
By contrast, in Australia, some states have abolished these doctrines (e.g., Victoria, New South 
Wales, Australian Capital Territory, and South Australia).
107
 
 
II. POTENTIAL REASONS FOR A LOW LEI FREQUENCY AND LEI’S INFLUENCE 
ON TPF 
 
The data in section I demonstrate that the frequency of purchasing legal expenses 
insurance is relatively low in many countries.  This section, examines several potential 
explanations for this phenomenon.  It discusses the plausibility of each explanation, and where 
available, uses empirical research in support.  It then analyzes whether these explanations may 
influence the development of TPF. 
 
A. The existence of alternatives for access to justice 
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1. LEI 
 
A first potential explanation relates to alternative methods for settling disputes.  In some 
legal systems, risk-averse individuals may use a results-based compensation system to pay their 
lawyers.  In the U.S., for example, the vast majority of individual plaintiff‘s attorneys bring cases 
on a contingency fee basis in tort litigation.
108
  In 1995, the United Kingdom instituted a variant 
of a contingent fee system known as the conditional fee arrangement.  Under this arrangement, 
the attorney pays all the plaintiff‘s costs if the case is lost, but receives her hourly wages plus a 
mark-up if the case is won or if there is a settlement.
109
  Demand for LEI may be lower in legal 
systems where individuals can reduce the risk of a trial via result-based compensation systems. 
Additionally, demand for LEI should be lower if victims, ex ante, know that the state will 
cover at least some part of their trial costs.  Demand for LEI may be even lower in systems that 
provide legal aid.  Further, it is possible that when a state reduces the financing of its legal aid 
scheme, demand for LEI will subsequently increase.  Simple economics dictates this result.  If 
potential victims can rely on state aid that would, hypothetically, provide the same quality of 
services provided via LEI, relying on publicly-provided legal aid is the cheapest option, as there 
is no premium to be paid.  In that sense, state-provided legal aid creates a moral hazard problem 
because victims can free ride on the state.  A similar argument has been made with respect to 
disaster insurance.
110
  Some scholars claim that the low demand for this type of insurance is 
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related to the state‘s generous ex post relief following an accident.111  Potential victims would 
free ride on the state rather than pay a premium.
112
    
Empirical research supports many of these theoretical findings.  For example, a recent 
study from the Netherlands states that the growth of LEI between 1970 and 2009 parallels 
regular cuts in legal aid and increases in private contributions.
113
  However, the availability of 
public legal aid or results-based compensation systems cannot fully explain the low frequency of 
LEI in some countries.  Even though contingency fees may be useful in many instances, they do 
not help  those who have suffered relatively small losses and plaintiffs in non-monetary disputes.  
In the United Kingdom, not all cases can be financed under a Conditional Fee Arrangement and 
therefore citizens may demand LEI.
114
  There are also countries where the people cannot afford 
legal costs, only a fraction are eligible for free legal aid, and no-cure, no-pay, and quota pars litis 
are prohibited, but yet LEI is not widespread.  In 2003, 75% of the Belgian population claimed 
that the costs of a legal proceeding were too high (of the 25% who could afford litigation, 10% 
had independent financing and 15% qualified for legal aid).
115
  Given the prohibition of 
output-based remuneration systems and low amounts of public legal aid, one would expect a 
strong demand for LEI in Belgium.  However, this is not the case. 
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2. TPF 
There are parallels between the demand for LEI and the demand for TPF.  As with LEI, 
the demand for TPF can largely be explained by the availability of alternatives.  In jurisdictions 
where publicly-provided legal aid is generous, which could cause a moral hazard or ―charity 
hazard,‖ problem the demand for TPF will likely be relatively small.  Litigants will not demand 
TPF if they can free ride on state provided legal aid.  To the contrary, demand for TPF will likely 
increase where alternative funding systems are unavailable or inadequate.  However, even if a 
country allows contingency fees, TPF may still have a future.  Contingency fees are limited in 
several ways.
116
  Contingency fees help plaintiffs transfer some litigation risk to their lawyers.
117
  
But there are investment cases that plaintiffs‘ lawyers are not eager to take.  TPF funding may 
persuade risk-averse lawyers to take these cases.  Also, lawyers cannot pay cash for a fraction of 
their clients‘ claims. 118   They can only advance out-of-pocket litigation expenses under 
contingency fees.  Additionally, contingency fee ―lawyers can only pay with their services.‖119  
This limits the fraction of a claim that a lawyer can purchase.
120
  When lawyers are the sole 
source of capital, its amount and timing is quite limited.  This reduces competition for 
capital-constrained clients, which leads to higher costs for these clients.  As Chen and Abrams 
(2011) put it, ―[b]y opening up provision of capital to the market, third party litigation funding 
solves a number of shortcomings this [sic] whereas contingency fees do not.‖121 
Another question is to what extent the existence of LEI could hinder the development of 
TPF.  As previously seen, in some countries a large fraction of the population is covered by LEI, 
generally after government intervention.  LEI is becoming more popular in other countries and 
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several countries, such as the UK, are working to promote LEI to more people.  Widespread LEI 
will substantially diminish the demand in the segment of consumer legal funding.  In other 
segments (loans to plaintiffs‘ law firms and investments in commercial claims), however, LEI 
cannot compete with TPF.  Because of moral hazard and adverse selection problems, LEI often 
provides relatively low upper limits on the maximum amount of coverage.  Moreover, TPF does 
not promote access to justice as much as it serves as a financing and funding instrument.  
Therefore, even under a contingency fee arrangement, which stimulates access to justice, TPF 
may still be an attractive instrument to obtain upfront funding for some plaintiffs. 
 
B. Adverse Selection 
 
1. LEI 
 
The problem of adverse selection may play a role in the case of LEI.  Some individuals 
may be more likely to file a lawsuit than others.  If an insurer cannot distinguish between these 
two groups, he is forced to average premiums between all of them.  Consequently, legal expenses 
insurance may be particularly attractive for high-risk individuals.
122
  As a result, those taking out 
LEI are more likely to be litigious, thereby increasing LEI premiums.  This may result in only 
the most litigious individuals being interested in taking out LEI.  Ultimately, this could lead to 
particular risks being uninsurable.
123
  Adverse selection problems are likely more substantial for 
stand-alone LEI products than for add-on legal expenses insurance since for the latter, LEI 
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policies are added to other types of insurance, which usually have  well-balanced risk pools.
124
  
However,  the market for these add-on policies is thin in many countries. 
 Nevertheless, theoretical insurance literature indicates that problems of adverse selection 
can be mitigated in several ways: the exclusion of certain risks from insurance,
125
 risk-based 
diversification of premiums,
126
 ceilings on the amount of coverage per period, and offering a 
variety of insurance policies with different combinations of coverage and premiums.
127
  Also, 
recent empirical research shows that adverse selection may depend heavily upon the type of 
insurance market and may not be as serious a problem in many insurance markets, contrary to 
suggestions in the literature.
128
 
 Recent empirical research from the Netherlands indicates that there is apparently not an 
adverse selection problem in the market for legal expenses insurance.
129
  This research uses data 
gathered in a 2009 ―Paths to Justice‖ survey.  The survey investigated the potential for 
sixty-seven different civil and administrative lawsuits, and other similar lawsuits, in the 
Netherlands from 2004 to 2008  The survey sample was representative of the Dutch population 
in terms of age, education and sex.  Respondents were asked if they were covered by any kind of 
LEI policy and, if so, which modules were covered.  Nearly 61% of the respondents faced one or 
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more non-trivial
130
 justiciable problem.  The average number of potential lawsuits for all 
respondents was 1.88.  The problem frequency of individuals with LEI, at 1.97, was 11% higher 
than for individuals without LEI, who faced 1.78 problems.  The researchers recognized that this 
difference could be explained by a selection effect and a behavioral effect (moral hazard, see also 
further at C.  When controlling for several personal characteristics, such as age, marital status, 
education and social group, the researchers found that LEI holdership increased the frequency of 
justiciable problems by 8%.  In other words, there was a selection effect of 3% and a behavioral 
effect of 8%.  In sum, it is unlikely that adverse selection can explain the relatively small size of 
LEI markets. 
2. TPF 
 
Adverse selection may also plague TPF markets.  The exact nature and extent of this 
problem may depend on the TPF segment involved.  In the segment of consumer legal funding, 
those consumers who think that they are more likely to obtain little or no recovery outside of 
their non-recourse loan envisage lower costs to promising to pay out of their proceeds.  Because 
individual transactions are fairly small in this segment, TPF suppliers will not be willing to spend 
a lot on due diligence costs, or evaluating the prospects for repayment.  This relates to the 
general notion that adverse selection stems from information asymmetry between the individual 
covered by TPF and the funding agent.  The individual may have better information on his case‘s 
quality but may not be willing to reveal this to the financing agent in order to get a better deal on 
the TPF.  For small risks, because an individual risk assessment is too costly, TPF agents will, 
just like insurers, classify risks and try to remedy adverse selection through risk classification.  
Nevertheless, there is a positive side.  Given the relatively small amount of funding per 
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transaction in consumer loans, well-capitalized suppliers can have many concurrently 
outstanding loans and therefore keep portfolio risks small, at least if the cases are sufficiently 
unrelated. 
The fact that contingency fees are prohibited in many European countries could make it 
more difficult for this segment to develop in Europe, at least when considering adverse selection 
problems.  When a lawyer has accepted a case on a contingency-fee basis, funders may view this 
as a positive signal about the merits of the case.  This could be especially helpful if TPF 
suppliers have information about how well lawyers screen cases.  Helland and Tabarrok‘s (2003) 
research finds that legal systems which support contingency fees increase legal quality and 
decrease the time to settlement.
131
  This is consistent with Dana and Spier‘s (1993) theoretical 
model, which demonstrates that contingency fees decrease frivolous lawsuits.
132
  Fenn and 
Rickman (2010) summarize empirical studies of contingency fee arrangements and find that 
lawyers who use no-win, no-fee arrangements screen their cases more and settle sooner.
133
  Of 
course, this screening is far from perfect.  Contingency fee lawyers may still bring weak cases, as 
long as the expected benefit outweighs the cost.  This will be especially true for large stakes 
claims.  With respect to plaintiffs‘ law firms loans, firms nearer to financial collapse are more 
likely to ask for a loan simply because they have little to lose.  TPF suppliers may be willing to 
spend more on evaluating the prospects for repayment than they would in consumer legal 
funding since loans are larger on average.  Finally, in commercial litigation investments, owners 
of commercial claims are more likely to share the financial upside of their claims when they are 
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less optimistic about the probability of winning the claim and subsequent damages.  However, in 
commercial litigation, TPF suppliers may be willing to invest more to evaluate the quality of the 
claim, given the larger amounts at stake. 
 
C. Moral Hazard 
 
1. LEI 
 
In the presence of asymmetric information, LEI markets may also suffer from moral 
hazard problems.
134
  Moral hazard is a fully insured individual‘s tendency to exercise less care in 
protecting themselves against loss.  It is a form of ex post opportunism, which occurs when the 
insurer cannot observe the actions of the insured.  In such a case, the insurer is unable to link 
premiums to an insured‘s actions.  The insured will reduce his level of care, thereby increasing 
insurance premiums.  The increase may be so large that individuals facing the risk choose to 
increase their private level of care rather than buy insurance.  The moral hazard problem, 
therefore, could cause a breakdown of the insurance market. 
 In the context of LEI, we can distinguish between several variants of moral hazard.  
Initially, people who know that they can rely on legal assistance in a legal dispute may be less 
hesitant to enter into situations that have the potential to generate legal problems.  For example, 
such a person may have a weaker incentive to screen for the reputation for default of a future 
contract party.  Individuals with LEI may also be more likely to bring existing problems to a 
head.
135
  Next, an insured person may be less hesitant to initiate legal proceedings than an 
uninsured person, even with a weak claim.
136
  Also, a policyholder may want to pursue a claim 
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more intensely than a person without LEI.
137
  He may want his insurer or lawyer to spend more 
time on the case than it is worth.  Finally, the insurer may face a moral hazard problem not only 
in his relationship with the insured, but also with the insured‘s lawyer.  Given an insurance 
company‘s deep pockets, a lawyer may feel less restricted to behave opportunistically. 
 As indicated above, there are several standard responses for moral hazard problems that 
can also be helpful in the context of LEI.
138
  Mechanisms can be introduced in an insured‘s 
policy that gives the insurer some control on whether to file a lawsuit or limit the free choice of 
an attorney, if legally permissible.
139
  In the latter case, the insurer has the advantage of limiting 
the choice of attorneys to the insured, thereby allowing the insurer to make ex ante fees 
agreements.  Also, the insurer can design contractual limitations that have the effect of risk 
sharing between insurer and insured, including deductibles, minimum claim levels, co-insurance, 
etc.
 140
  The insured then has an incentive to limit legal costs, at least to a certain extent.  Moral 
hazard on the side of the attorney is obviously  more prevalent in legal systems where hourly 
fees can be charged and fees are unregulated.
141
  Hence, it can be predicted that if legal systems 
regulate attorney‘s fees, this could increase the ex ante possibilities of adequate risk calculation 
for the insurer.  Thus, one could predict LEI to be more prevalent in legal systems where 
attorney‘s fees are regulated or other mechanisms exist whereby the insurer can control for moral 
hazard of the insured and attorneys (see section 2.1.3 for the case of Germany).  This may well 
explain the success of LEI in Denmark; because attorney‘s fees are in principle limited to the 
amount the insured would receive under legal aid, moral hazard can be effectively controlled. 
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 Empirical research from the Netherlands shows that the moral hazard problem is 
relatively small in the context of LEI.
142
  LEI holdership increases problem frequency by 8% (see 
also at 3.6.1).  German research shows that LEI does not automatically lead to an explosion in 
litigation.  Insured plaintiffs litigate only 5%–10% more often than uninsured plaintiffs.143     As 
a result, it  seems unlikely that moral hazard can explain the low frequency of LEI in certain 
places. 
2. TPF 
 
Moral hazard problems can also be present in the market for TPF.  In the context of 
consumer legal funding, as soon as a consumer‘s prospect of having money left after paying the 
TPF supplier gets sufficiently small, the consumer has no incentive to pursue his claim.  Of 
course, this will drive up the price of the non-recourse loans.  But again, moral hazard may be 
problematic, although not insurmountable, under TPF.  The TPF contract can, for example, 
contain clauses guaranteeing the consumer‘s cooperation even after the initial sum has been 
received.  That may indeed be the main problem in each TPF segment: creating incentives for the 
decision maker (the TPF receiver or supplier) to account for both entities‘ costs and benefits, 
rather than only its own.  As long as the decision maker bears an equal share of the costs and 
benefits of each additional investment in the case, he can be expected to behave in an optimal 
way from the point of view of both the TPF receiver and supplier.  Under such a scheme, the 
decision maker‘s marginal costs equal his marginal benefits at the same point where total 
marginal costs equal total marginal benefits.
144
  However, such incentive schemes are not 
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observed in the three different segments of TPF, so some moral hazard problems should be 
expected. 
 One may fear that TPF of mass consumer claims may increase the incentive to file 
frivolous and weak class action suits.  Even without TPF, some observers feel that the settlement 
leverage created by class certification pressures defendants to settle these suits.
145
  The main 
reason is that class actions magnify the stakes and complexity of an action.  This compounds the 
defendant‘s litigation, reputation, and risk-bearing costs.  Several reform proposals have been 
advanced: strengthening sanctions for frivolous filings, shifting some portion of the winner‘s 
attorney‘s fee to the losing side,146 having the trial judge conduct a preliminary merits review at 
the certification stage,
147
 and having the judge hold multiple class trials and base his or her 
judgment on a weighted combination of the several verdicts.
148
 
 
D. Positive externalities/the free rider problem   
 
1. LEI 
 
Recently, another reason for a market failure in LEI has been advanced.
149
  The 
difficulties of LEI could be attributed to free rider problems that result from positive 
externalities.  Insurance generally does not create positive externalities.  For example, if an 
insured piece of jewelry is stolen, only the owner will benefit from the theft insurance.  Legal 
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expenses insurance, however, may create positive externalities.  A potential victim with LEI may 
be able to bring a case to court that he would not otherwise have brought because of 
risk-aversion or lack of funds.  When more individuals take LEI, the probability that an injurer 
will avoid consequences decreases.  A potential injurer takes this into account when deciding on 
his care level and takes additional care.  The additional deterrence created by LEI-driven 
litigation lowers the probability that other people will get injured.  So individuals only 
internalize a small part of the deterrent effect of taking LEI and thereby benefit from others‘ 
decisions to take LEI.  In theory, this can lead to a free rider problem.  Obviously, this effect is 
only relevant in situations where the injurer cannot differentiate between parties with and 
without an insurance policy (as is generally the case for torts).
150
  Furthermore, the free rider 
problem can expected to be most prevalent in cases in which first-party damage insurance is 
available.  If first-party damage insurance is unavailable or only partially available, then 
potential victims will be more inclined to take LEI if they are sufficiently risk-averse. 
Even if potential victims would not have an incentive to free ride, there could be a free 
rider problem on the supply side when the deterrence benefits of LEI-driven litigation are 
substantial.  For example, if an insurance company has a market share of 10% in the LEI market, 
then 90% of the deterrence benefits of each LEI policy will go to other insurance companies.  
This could lead to a free rider problem that prevents the insurance industry from taking 
meaningful action.
151
  This could explain why there are so few companies that offer very 
comprehensive policies.
152
  A similar argument has been made with respect to Lojack.
153
  The 
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question why most auto insurance companies give no discount for Lojack has been answered 
from two different perspectives.
154
  According to one view, Lojack is not a winner for insurers 
with a relatively low market share, as most of the benefit will go to their rivals.
155
  According to 
another view, Lojack is probably not very effective.  If it were, the free rider problem could be 
easily solved.  If car manufacturers would install Lojack on their cars, thieves would stay away 
from these cars, and the manufacturers would reap the benefits.
156
  Even if this argument is 
correct, it would be hard to find an analogous market solution in the context of LEI for torts. 
 
2. TPF 
 
The previous section has shown that there can be a problem of positive externalities 
stemming from potential victims‘ decisions on whether or not to take LEI.  In the context of 
TPF, individuals deciding whether to use TPF will also not take the positive externalities of their 
decisions into account.  This is a straightforward application of Shavell‘s theory (1982). 157  
When a victim has suffered harm, he does not take the general deterrent effect of his lawsuit into 
account, as filing a lawsuit cannot change the injurer‘s behavior.  The victim only looks at the 
damages he could be awarded.  The previous section has also demonstrated that the presence of 
positive externalities may lead legal expenses insurers not to offer comprehensive LEI.  In the 
context of TPF, however, there may be a different problem.  If a TPF supplier provides 
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substantial funds for a specific type of claim, this may increase deterrence for these claims.  
Consequently, there will be fewer of these cases in the future, which reduces the future profits of 
the TPF industry in this particular segment.  The company that provides funds for these claims 
only suffers part of the harm and the rest is externalized; other companies‘ future profits decrease 
as well.  From the TPF industry‘s perspective, there may be too much TPF.  Each company may 
only suffer a small future loss if TPF is currently provided on a generous basis and for claims 
that can rather easily be deterred.  But the loss of profit for the entire industry could be 
substantial. 
 What if the TPF industry is not competitive or the various suppliers can make agreements 
about the funds they channel to various types of claims?  In such a scenario, funds may not go to 
the claims that, from a social perspective, are the most deserving of funding—the cases that can 
be easily deterred.  It is unlikely that the TPF industry has an interest in substantially decreasing 
the accident rate, as the need for TPF decreases when more accidents are deterred.  A 
monopolistic TPF industry will provide funding until its marginal benefit equals its marginal 
cost.  That industry will prefer to divert funds to cases that are difficult to deter because those 
will not affect the industry‘s future income stream. 
A parallel can be drawn here to the insurance industry‘s incentives to reduce the accident 
rate.  In the insurance literature, there is a striking diversity in viewpoints with respect to the 
industry‘s interest in accident reduction.158  According to one view, the insurance industry has a 
positive interest in accident reduction.
159
  Another view states that the industry is simply not 
                                               
     
158
 See generally GERALD J.S. WILDE, TARGET RISK (1994). 
     
159
 As one commentator puts it:  ―[I]t is obviously of great interest for the insurance companies . . . to reduce the 
number of traffic accidents and consequently their cost.‖  Tore Vaaje, Rewarding in Insurance: Return of Part of 
Premium After a Claim-Free Period, 1990 PROCEEDINGS, OECD/ECMT SYMPOSIUM ON ENFORCEMENT AND 
REWARDING: STRATEGIES AND EFFECTS. 
 33 
interested in accident reduction.
160
  A third view holds that the industry‘s interest  is served if the 
accident rate is at a high level
161
  Note that insurers may have an interest in a high accident rate 
under some types of premium regulation.  This question has received relatively little attention in 
the law and economics literature.  In the context of product liability litigation, Viscusi (1991) 
notes that, ―in the long run the insurance industry will profit from a high level of liability since 
that will increase the degree of coverage it can write.‖162  Note that this problem may also arise 
in the context of LEI.  Offering comprehensive LEI policies could also reduce the accident rate 
for some types of claims.  Whether this problem is substantial for LEI will depend on (1) the 
relationship between profit per insurance contract and the types and frequency of accidents and 
(2) whether LEI insurers and liability insurers or damage insurers are integrated.  It is worth 
recognizing that the additional premium income from LEI would partially offset the losses in 
premium income for other insurance policies.
163
 
 
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TPF AND LEI   
 
A. The volume of litigation 
 
1. TPF 
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According to some, an increase in litigation due to the availability of TPF is a matter of 
simple economics.
164
  For example, third-party financing may increase the amount and cost of 
litigation for business disputes.  Without TPF, a business-plaintiff will compare the internal cost 
of capital with the expected return from filing a lawsuit.  The case will be filed only if the 
expected return is large enough.  If TPF is available at a lower expected cost than the internal 
cost of capital, then there may be more litigation by business-plaintiffs.
165
  This cost-reducing 
effect of TPF may also increase the amount of litigation by reducing the settlement surplus.  
Indeed, when the plaintiff‘s or defendant‘s trial costs decrease, the settlement surplus 
decreases.
166
  This generally leads to more trials, as one of the reasons that parties settle is to 
avoid the costs of trial.  TPF can also increase the volume of litigation involving individuals as 
plaintiffs.  In the U.S., these plaintiffs can often rely on contingency fees to finance litigation.  
This does not mean that TPF will not increase litigation in this segment, however.  There are 
positive expected value cases that individual attorneys or law firms are unwilling to accept on a 
contingency fee basis because of the large risk attached to them (e.g., large class actions).
167
  At 
the same time, limits on economies of scale make litigation in many very large cases infeasible.  
Here, third-party financing could fill a gap
168
 because there are greater economies of scale in 
finance than in litigation.
169
  A recent empirical study by Chen and Abrams
170
 found that the 
number of suits increased in Australia after it allowed the free sale of lawsuits. 
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 Others are more hesitant to draw such a general conclusion for various reasons.
171
  First, 
the fact that TPF allows more individuals or organizations to bring claims that they otherwise 
would not bring or fight a claim more vigorously increases the deterrence of behavior that could 
lead to lawsuits.  Consequently, the availability of funds to pursue litigation does not 
unambiguously increase litigation.
172
  Second, because Abrams and Chen‘s statistical analyses 
rely on small sample sizes (five to seven observations),  more empirical research is necessary.  
Third, the question of whether TPF will substantially increase the volume of litigation may vary 
by country, depending on the instruments currently available in that country to increase access to 
the courts.  For example, the resulting increase in litigation in the U.S. could be modest if 
lawsuits are not currently filed not because of a lack of capital, but because of a lack of 
additional potential claims that contingency fee lawyers are willing to take.
173
  In Europe, 
however, TPF‘s potential to increase litigation may be greater, as contingency fees are prohibited 
in many European countries, public support for legal aid is being reduced in some European 
countries,  and LEI is not generally widespread. 
 As Garber (2010) points out, the conditions needed for TPF to increase litigation may 
strongly depend on the TPF segment involved.
174
  Regarding loans to plaintiffs‘ law firms, an 
increase in the volume of litigation is to be expected if firms use the funds to take on more 
clients instead of smoothing their cash flow or working more on the cases that they have already 
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taken.
175
  For investments in commercial claims, the number of claims may increase substantially 
where the economics of a claim look attractive to a TPF supplier, but companies are not able or 
willing to use internal capital to pay hourly legal expenses and cannot find a law firm to 
represent them on a contingency-fee basis.  The strength of the effect in this segment is difficult 
to predict, as there are many unknowns regarding these conditions.  For example, it is unclear 
whether TPF suppliers have the capacity or willingness to make TPF available to companies that 
are truly capital-constrained.  Also, it is unknown whether the level of demand for contingency 
fee-based legal services in commercial litigation exceeds supply or not.  If it does, there could be 
a considerable demand for TPF in this segment. 
 
2. LEI 
 
On a theoretical level, LEI may increase the volume of litigation for several reasons.  
First of all, a person with LEI may face more justiciable incidents as a result of moral hazard (see 
section 3.7.1).  However, empirical research from Germany and the Netherlands has shown that 
the effect of moral hazard is relatively small.  Second, given a justiciable problem, LEI lowers 
the threshold for undertaking legal action.  Claims with negative expected value may now be 
pursued because the insurer pays a portion of the cost.
176
  Note, however, that costs such as 
psychological costs and the opportunity cost of time are not externalized to the insurer.     Third, 
LEI promotes the filing of suit by risk-averse plaintiffs, as they do not bear the full litigation cost 
risk.  Fourth, with LEI, liquidity-constrained plaintiffs may now bring suit where they otherwise 
would not have been able to do so.  Recent empirical research from the Netherlands sheds some 
light on the question of whether LEI holders react differently from non-insured individuals when 
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faced with a justiciable problem.
177
  Of all the individuals who faced a justiciable problem but 
did not have LEI, 7.5% did nothing, 47.4% sought to resolve the problem without help, and 
45.1% sought advice from one or more experts or organizations.  LEI holders seek more advice 
and are less inclined to resolve the problem without help: 4.8% did nothing, 37.7% sought to 
resolve the problem without help, and 57.5% sought advice from one or more experts or 
organizations.  The difference between the insured and the non-insured specifically holds for the 
higher income classes. 
Finally, during settlement negotiations, an insured plaintiff may take a tougher stance 
against the defendant, as he does not bear all of the costs of a trial.  Because the settlement 
surplus decreases, the frequency of trial can be expected to increase.  However, this does not 
account for the active role that legal expenses insurers may play in the settlement stage.  In 
countries like Belgium, where lawyers enjoy monopoly rights for representation in court but not 
for out-of-court work, an insurer can reserve the right to take all necessary steps to settle the 
case.
178
  Because the insurer bears most or all of the costs, he may have a large incentive to settle 
the case.  The fact that the settlement frequency of claims covered by LEI (80%) is perceived to 
be significantly larger than the settlement frequency of other claims seems to confirm this.
179
  
However, this result could also be the consequence of selection effects.  According to the 
standard relative optimism model of litigation, the settlement frequency is larger for smaller 
claims,
180
 and LEI can be expected to stimulate some of these smaller claims, as empirical 
research has shown that LEI promotes the settlement of some smaller cases.
181
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In countries like Germany, however, where lawyers enjoy monopoly rights not just for 
representation in court but also for out of court work, the insurer‘s role in the settlement process 
may be more limited.  Empirical research from Germany shows that the trial frequency of claims 
covered by LEI is somewhat larger than for claims not covered by LEI.
182
  Research from the 
Netherlands shows that court proceedings were started in 4% of problems for individuals without 
LEI and in 6.5% of problems for individuals with LEI.
183
  The difference is more substantial for 
higher income classes.  Similar to the case of TPF, the presence of LEI may increase deterrence, 
which may have a mitigating effect on the volume of litigation.  Hence, one should always be 
careful in interpreting these numbers: if the volume of cases increases under LEI, then from a 
social welfare perspective this is not always an undesirable effect.  It might be undesirable if LEI 
claims are brought with a so-called nuisance value, but precisely because access to justice is 
costly without LEI, there may in fact be too few claims and hence underdeterrence. 
B. The quality of litigation and the accuracy of settlements  
 
1. TPF 
 
Some commentators expect that TPF will increase the number of lawsuits that have no or 
dubious legal merit.
184
  The reason that this may be the case is because plaintiffs (and their 
lawyers) are more eager to bring such lawsuits if they are not fully financing the cases 
themselves.  However, it is quite unlikely that consumer legal funding will substantially increase 
the volume of meritless cases.  These loans are typically less than 10%of the estimated 
recoveries in the underlying lawsuits.
185
  Concerning loans to plaintiffs‘ law firms, TPF suppliers 
do not want to lend to firms who hold many low-probability claims, as the suppliers do not share 
in the upside potential of these claims.  The precise effect on the proportion of lawsuits with low 
probabilities will depend on the due diligence processes.  The situation may be different for 
investments in commercial claims.  For commercial claims, TPF suppliers share in the upside 
potential of the claim.  Given that low-probability suits can have high expected profits, TPF 
suppliers may choose to invest in these cases. 
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Some scholars, however, doubt that the effect on the volume of low-probability cases will 
be substantial.
186
  First, TPF suppliers seem to find more than enough investment opportunities 
among claims with relatively high probabilities of recovery.  Second, concentrating investments 
in claims that have high probabilities of recovery may be the best risk-management strategy.  It 
seems that the TPF companies are not sufficiently capitalized to have enough cases in their 
portfolio so that their portfolio risk is negligible.  Juridica, for example, rejects claims ―that raise 
novel legal questions or that will probably end up before a jury.‖187  Of course, things could 
change, but for now, large capital providers such as banks and insurance companies have stayed 
away because of the legal uncertainty that surrounds litigation funding.
188
  If this uncertainty 
vanishes, investing in nuisance suits may be a viable business model for these corporations.  
Also, the high rates of return that current TPF suppliers receive may attract new capital into this 
market.  Some TPF suppliers that lack the skills to evaluate complex cases effectively could 
enter, which  may lead to an increase in lawsuits that lack merit.  In the long run, however, 
investing in meritless cases will lead to losses, and these suppliers will disappear from the 
market. 
 Imbalances in risk preferences may skew settlement amounts.  A repeat-player defendant 
who faces many suits from one-time plaintiffs can expect to settle many cases below the mean 
damages award, as the one-time plaintiff will be more fearful of the worst case scenario than the 
repeat-player defendant, who can pool the litigation risks.  The problem may be especially large 
in personal injury lawsuits.  For these suits, the spread of possible damages is large and the 
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disparity between the parties‘ ability to cope with litigation risk is enormous. 189   Thus, 
settlements that reflect bargaining power more than legal merit can be expected.  Third-party 
financing may promote more accurate settlements by leveling the playing field between plaintiffs 
and defendants.
190
  However, whether the availability of TPF currently has a significant effect on 
the accuracy of settlement amounts is uncertain.  In the context of consumer loans, very high 
interest rates and the rapid accumulation of interest strips this mechanism of much of its value.  
Also, investment funds only invest in large commercial claims, not in smaller claims or personal 
injury claims held by individuals. 
 
2. LEI 
 
It is often alleged that LEI causes a flood of unmeritorious litigation.
191
  In theory, a 
plaintiff may be interested in pursuing a claim that has virtually no chance of winning because 
someone else bears the expenditures—the insurer.  In reality, it is highly unlikely that an insurer 
will provide coverage for weak claims.  Legal expenses insurers have a relatively strong 
incentive to carefully screen cases before granting coverage, as insurers bear all or most of the 
costs of a trial but reap no direct financial benefits.
192
  In practice, legal expenses insurers weed 
out weak cases through various mechanisms.  For example, most LEI policies include a 
deductible.
193
  Of course, a deductible will not only filter out some weak cases, but will also hold 
back some strong cases with small stakes.  Additionally, LEI policies often include a merits test.  
In the absence of such a clause in the contract, doctrines of contract law may allow an insurer to 
                                               
     
189
 See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 85 
(2010). 
     
190
 Id. 
     
191
 See, e.g., Kilian, supra note 5, at 45. 
     
192
 We can thus expect that legal expense insurers have a stronger incentive to screen cases than hourly fee 
lawyers and contingency fee lawyers. 
     
193
 Kilian, supra note 5, at 46. 
 41 
decline coverage for unreasonable and futile claims, or for claims that lack evidence.
194
  A 
German research report shows that litigants with LEI won their cases slightly more often (3 %) 
than self-financing litigants who paid their lawyers a fixed fee at every stage of the litigation 
process.
195
  This could be a reflection of more careful case screening.  However, the result could 
also be explained by a selection effect, as LEI will induce the filing of some strong claims with 
stakes that are relatively small but still greater than the deductible. 
C. The timing of settlements 
 
1. TPF 
 
TPF may increase a defendant‘s willingness to settle at an earlier stage for several 
reasons.
196
  First, a defendant who knows that the plaintiff has TPF may realize that certain 
threats made during the negotiations are no longer credible, thereby decreasing the defendant‘s 
bargaining power.  Also, a TPF supplier‘s willingness to fund a case may be seen by the 
defendant as a signal that the case is of relatively high quality.  Empirical research by Fenn and 
Rickman has shown that high-quality cases settle earlier.  The authors  have found that the more 
the defendant thinks he is liable, the shorter the delay of settlement.
197
  Likewise, they have 
found that cases in which the insurer believes its policyholder is fully responsible are associated 
with shorter delays of settlement.
198
  Finally, their research has discovered that cases in which a 
hospital initially believes it is not liable survive much longer before settling compared to cases 
where the hospital initially believes it is liable.
199
  Furthermore, the arrival of new information 
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weakening a hospital‘s case speeds up the settlement process and leads to longer durations before 
a case is dropped.  That signal may be especially relevant for investments in commercial claims 
because of the rigorousness of due diligence processes.
200
 
If, however, investing in nuisance suits may be or become a viable business model for TPF 
suppliers, then TPF may no longer signal case quality.  In the context of consumer legal funding, 
TPF may decrease the proportion of plaintiffs that are eager to settle early, because the loans 
enable plaintiffs to pay their bills in the interim.  Also, TPF may sometimes reduce the 
willingness of a plaintiff to settle late in the life of the underlying claim, because the amount 
owed to the TPF supplier can eventually exceed what the defendant is willing to offer during 
settlement.  The plaintiff may then prefer to go to trial, hoping for a recovery that is larger than 
the amount owed to the TPF supplier.  During the period inbetween the initial and the later 
phases of the settlement process, consumer legal funding may promote earlier settlements due to 
the rapid rate at which a plaintiff‘s debt to a TPF supplier increases.  Likewise, a law firm paying 
interest on a loan may have a relatively strong incentive to settle quite early so it can repay its 
debt from the proceeds. 
2. LEI 
 
An empirical study by Fenn et al. (2005) finds that claims funded by LEI in England and 
Wales settle faster than claims funded by other means.
201
  This can be explained quite easily.  
Because the insurer internalizes the costs—either in whole or in large part—of the settlement, he 
has every incentive to settle early.  This effect will be largest if the insurer is in charge of the 
settlement negotiations.
202203
  But if an outside lawyer is in charge of the settlement negotiations, 
the case may still settle earlier than cases that are not funded by LEI.  This is because the insurer 
is probably in a better position to control for lawyer opportunism than an individual without LEI.  
The lawyer monitored by an insurer will shirk less and will settle a case sooner on average. 
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D. The costs of (individual) disputes 
 
1. TPF 
 
Generally speaking, whether and how TPF will influence the costs of individual disputes 
depends on whether TPF suppliers are able to influence how cases are pursued.
204
  
Unfortunately, this is unknown.
205
  Expenditures will generally increase when TPF is sought 
primarily to loosen cash constraints (this can be the case for loans to consumers, loans to plaintiff 
law firms, and investment in commercial litigation).  Cash-constrained plaintiffs tend to invest 
less in out-of-pocket expenses (e.g., expert consultants and witnesses).  Regarding investments in 
commercial litigation, the effect on expenditures depends to a large extent on the share of the 
recovery and the costs for the TPF supplier. 
 
2. LEI 
 
Obviously, LEI can be expected to increase the costs of individual disputes.  A plaintiff without 
LEI has to pay for each additional hour his lawyer spends on the case, whereas a plaintiff with 
LEI can use LEI staff, or, if necessary, a lawyer at no or reduced cost.  Recent Dutch empirical 
research confirms this, at least for the high-income class.
206
  The intensity of the contacts with 
legal advisors is significantly higher for the highest income earners once they are insured (2.09 
contacts versus 1.73 contacts).
207
  For lower income classes, the impact of LEI is mainly by 
substitution.
208
  The direct assistance of LEI staff comes, to a large extent, in place of the 
subsidized lawyer.
209
  The researchers are aware that other factors may have played a role in the 
use of legal advisers.
210
  After controlling for other relevant factors like type of problem, gravity 
and complexity of the problem, expected revenue, and personal characteristics, multivariate 
analysis corroborates their findings.
211
  As a person actively responds to a justiciable problem, 
LEI increases the chance that a person will seek more legal advice.
212
  Income is an important 
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factor when people are not insured: the number of contacts with legal advisers decreases with 
income.
213
  When individuals are insured, the effect of income is insignificant.
214
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 It is unlikely that LEI is a substantial barrier to the development of TPF.  The reason is 
simple: LEI is underused in the U.S. and many European countries.  Only countries where LEI is 
mandatory (as an add-on to household insurance, like in Sweden) have wide coverage.  
Regarding the social welfare effects of both instruments, TPF does not necessarily do worse than 
LEI as far as the volume of litigation, the quality of litigation, and the timing of settlements is 
concerned.  So far, legal systems in Europe are rather hostile towards TPF, because they consider 
it contrary to public policy.  However, given the low coverage of LEI and reduced legal aid in 
many European legal systems, TPF can effectively promote access to justice even though such a 
goal may not be its primary function.  For example, by providing the possibility of upfront 
payment to plaintiffs, litigation can be made more attractive, even when it is used in combination 
with other techniques like contingency fees.  Thus, TPF certainly merits further analysis and 
could serve important social goals by promoting access to justice and providing further 
deterrence, reducing accidents and personal injury. 
                                               
     
213
 Id. 
     
214
 Id. 
